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ESSAY

Free Speech for Judges.
A Commentary on Lubet et al. v. Posner
Monroe H. Freedman

against Richard Posner, the widely respected former chief
leveled
hasforbeen
judicial
of unethical
the Seventh
Courtconduct
of Appeals
judge of the
United States
Circuit. The critics are two widely respected legal scholars,
Professors Steven Lubet and Ronald Dworkin.' Judge Posner, in
turn, has vigorously defended himself.2 Given the intellectual
stature of the antagonists, it is not surprising that both sides are
right. In my view, however, Judge Posner is more right.
The criticism relates to Judge Posner's book, An Affair of State:
The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton.
The New York Times called it one of the ten best books of 1999,
and it was a finalist for the Los Angeles Times Book Award.
Professors Lubet and Dworkin's questions about judicial ethics
relate to Judge Posner's charges that President Clinton and others committed various unlawful acts. For example, Professor
Lubet notes Judge Posner's allegation that "Clinton engaged in a
pattern of criminal behavior and obsessive public lying, the tendency of which was to disparage, undermine, and even subvert
the judicial system of the United States."' Elsewhere, Judge
Posner suggests that President Clinton is guilty of perjury, wire
fraud, criminal contempt, the making of false statements to the
government, and aiding and abetting a crime.
The basis for questioning Judge Posner's ethics is the Code of
Judicial Conduct for United States Judges. 5 Canon 3A(6) of the
Code says that a judge should abstain from public comment
about a "pending or impending proceeding in any court" if the
comment might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of
the proceeding or impair its fairness.6
At the time An Affair of State was published, there was known
to be an active criminal investigation by the Independent Counsel
into President Clinton's conduct; also, professional disciplinary
proceedings against the President in Arkansas were clearly foreseeable. Thus, Professor Lubet says, proceedings against Clinton
were impending. Judge Posner protests, however, that there was
no "impending proceeding" within the meaning of the Canon.
He insists that "impending" does not mean "possible sometime in
the future." Rather, he says, the word means "about to happen"

or "imminent." In Professor Lubet's view, however, the import of
"impending proceeding" is broader, embracing any proceeding
"that can be identified ... as a dispute between recognizable parties over identifiable facts and circumstances," regardless of
whether litigation has already been filed in court.
Certainly in the context of the Clinton matter, Judge Posner's
contention that there was no impending proceeding is a quibble.
Indeed, once the Canon is properly construed, even Professor
Lubet's somewhat broader definition of "impending" is also too
narrow.
Judge Posner is correct in saying that his book is entitled to
First Amendment protection. Moreover, in commenting on a
matter of public importance-specifically, criticizing the conduct
of the highest public official in the nation-Judge Posner was
unquestionably exercising a "core First Amendment right."
Accordingly, any limitation on his speech would have to withstand "exacting scrutiny" That means that the government (acting here through the Federal Judicial Conference) must carry the
burden of demonstrating a "subordinating interest [that] is compelling." Further, the Conference must show that the regulation
of that compelling interest is "closely drawn" to avoid any
unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment rights.8
Professor Lubet says that one reason for restraining Judge
Posner's speech is that "the outspoken opinion of a respected
federal judge might influence the prosecutor's decision about
whether or not to proceed."9 But think about that standard.
After all, a prosecutor's decision about whether to proceed in a
particular case might be influenced by the outspoken opinion of
a respected member of Congress, or of another prosecutor, or of
an editorial writer for the New York Times, or even by the outspoken opinion of a respected law professor. The slope is not
only slippery but virtually bottomless. Indeed, Professor Lubet
goes so far as to find it "instructive" that Judge Posner criticized
Abner Mikva for publicly attacking the integrity of Kenneth
Starr, since Mikva, in Judge Posner's words, was "mantled with
the prestige of a former chief judge of a federal court of
appeals."'o Rather than relying on Judge Posner's criticism of
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Mikva as authority for limiting speech, Professor Lubet should
have recognized it as a chilling presage of where his own argument is heading.
Professor Lubet adds, however, that because Judge Posner is a
judge, his comments on a matter under investigation might
"compromisle] the neutrality of the federal judiciary."" For my
own part, I haven't seen anything like that happen in this case.
Nor, more important, does that concern-unsupported by any
experience in fact-rise to the status of a "subordinating interest
that is compelling." The independent counsel, after all, was
working in Washington, D.C., while Judge Posner sits in
Chicago, Illinois. Thus, the judge could have no direct influence
over the prosecutor, nor would he have occasion to adjudicate
any controverted issue that might result from the Independent
Counsel's investigation.
The previous sentence suggests, however, that there is at least
one compelling interest in limiting judges' speech. If a judge
were to comment on a controverted issue in an impending case
that later came before that very judge, the judge's impartiality
might be subject to reasonable question. In that event, the judge
would be required to recuse himself under the federal judicial
disqualification statute.12 To avoid that situation, Canon 3A(6)
should be construed to apply to a controverted issue where there
is a reasonable possibility that the issue will be contested in a
case that will come before the judge for decision. Otherwise, the
judge would be limiting his ability to carry out his judicial
responsibilities in the public interest.
In addition, as Judge Posner rightly points out, the Canon
protects a judicial candidate in Senate confirmation hearings
from being pressured into taking premature positions on controversial cases that might come before her.'3 Here again, the result
would be mandatory disqualification of the judge from hearing
those cases. And here again, the judge should be forbidden by
the Canon from expressing an opinion on any controverted issue
where there is a reasonably possibility that the issue will later
come before the judge for decision.
Arguably, Professor Lubet's expansive reading of the proscription in Canon 3A(6) is correct as a matter of plain meaning.
That is, the literal language of the Canon appears to forbid a
judge, broadly, from commenting on a proceeding in any court,
regardless of how absurd it is to think that the judge might ever
preside over that proceeding. What I am suggesting, on the
other hand, is that the limitation on judicial speech in Canon
3A(6) be construed narrowly to apply only when there is a reasonable possibility that the proceeding will come before the
judge for decision. This narrower reading would avoid uncon-

stitutionally impinging on judges' speech (or, at least, it would
avoid the difficult constitutional issue regarding judges' core
First Amendment speech).
At the same time, I would construe the word "impending"
more broadly than either Judge Posner or Professor Lubet has
done, so that it covers any controverted issue where there is a
reasonable possibility that the issue will later come before the
judge for decision.' 5 Reading the Canon in that way serves two
compelling interests-it discourages mandatory disqualification
of judges because of their prior comment on controverted issues
in cases that later come before them, and it discourages senatorial pressuring of judges to commit themselves on important
issues in advance of deciding those issues in cases that later come
before them.
Further, in order to avoid unduly restricting the free speech of
judges, as well as to avoid the kind of unfortunate debate that has
occurred with respect to Judge Posner's book, I would urge that
the first sentence of Canon 3A(6) of the Code ofJudicial Conduct
for United States Judges, and of Canon 3A(9) of the ABAs Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, be amended to read as follows:
A judge shall not make any public comment on
the merits of a case that is pending before the judge,
or make any public comment on the merits of any
other issue if there is a reasonable possibility that the
issue will be contested in a case that will come before
the judge.

11. Id. at 7.
12. 28 U.S.C. section 455(a) reads: "Any justice, judge, or magistrate
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
13. Lubet, On judge Posner, supra note 1, at 6.
14. I would argue with him, however, about the impact of the limitation in Canon 3A(6) that the judge's comment is forbidden only
if it "might reasonably be expected to affect [the proceeding's]
outcome or impair its fairness." My particular concern about that
language is that it is not sufficient to avoid a chilling effect on
judicial speech, or to avoid the kind of unfortunate debate that

has occurred with respect to Judge Posner's book.
15. Judge Posner would limit "impending" to mean "imminent."
Professor Lubet would limit it to mean any proceeding "that can

Although I believe that the present provision can properly be
construed to mean just that, the amendment would resolve an
important issue, and resolve it in a way that is consistent with
judges' First Amendment rights and with the public interest.
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be identified . . . as a dispute between recognizable parties over

identifiable facts and circumstances." The latter definition is too
narrow to protect a judicial candidate from being pressured to
commit herself on, say, the constitutionality of hypothetical abortion or gun-control legislation, when there is no current dispute
between "recognizable parties" over "identifiable facts and circumstances."
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